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Productive
mimesis
and
parler-femme:
A
theory
towards
becoming
Siren



A woman enters centre stage. She is known at the club as La Llorona, “the weeping woman”. She emerges from the dark space between two red velvet curtains, her auburn hair piled high on her head, loose curls hanging down around her face. And her face... Her face is sparkling! Her eyes are painted bright red and yellow, her lips a deep red to match, and there is a single glistening tear suspended from the corner of her right eye.

She slowly glides towards the microphone at the front of the stage and, closing her eyes, begins to sing. There is no orchestra, no backing track, just her voice, which reverberates and echoes around the club, extending its limbs out towards us from the deep red chamber of her mouth. She is singing in Spanish and I find out later that it’s a version of Roy Orbison’s ‘Crying’, a song about running into an ex-lover on the street, who proceeds to touches your hand and talk small talk, all the while not knowing how much you have cried over them, about how much you miss them.

I don’t understand the words La Llorona is singing but it doesn’t matter. I feel every inch of her sorrow. My body feels heavy in my seat and I can’t take my eyes off her face, her furrowed brow accentuating the pain and desire in her voice. As she is singing it feels as if her lips are caressing my skin, scarring my body in lipstick, her voice piercing through my ears and stinging my eyes. I am crying. Tears are streaming down my face and I am shaking. I don’t even know this woman and I don’t even understand the words but the weight of the voice and the pain expressed is too much –

La Llorona is on the floor. She has fainted and two men

are hauling her limp body back through the gap in the curtains from which she emerged. The stage is empty but the voice is still singing. The performance is still happening, even with her gone. It’s become clear that she had been miming to a recording of the song rather than singing live, but no one in the audience seemed to care. The whole room remained still, listening to the disembodied voice of La Llorona as it ricocheted off walls and bodies. And I could feel every wave and every vibration as the tears continued to roll down my face.

A couple of years ago, in London, I was studying for my theology masters and was appalled when, for a module on *beauty* (and I emphasise beauty to stress the point), there were only white male writers on the reading list: from Plato to Alberti through to Kant and Burke and then up to Hegel, Nietzsche, Balthasar and David Bentley Hart, to name a few. A module discussing ideas of beauty in western theology and yet there were no writers who identified as other than male provided on the reading list. Women were mentioned, of course, but only by men; women were only ever spoken *for*, and were never given the space to speak for themselves...

Before coming to London to study my masters I had been in Reading studying art and history of art where I was introduced to feminist writers such as Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous, both of whom play an important part in this essay for their analyses and critiques of male philosophical texts, most notably those of Freud, Lacan and Deleuze. Both

Irigaray and Cixous challenge the phallogentrism of western philosophy, whereby women are often seen as the (negative) opposite of men. The word phallogentric refers principally to the writings of Freud who, on the question of female desire, concluded that it simply does not exist; it can only ever be measured against male desire because what women and little girls desire most is what they do not have – a penis¹. Lacan, in his re-readings of Freud, does not say that the little girl desires a penis as such, but that desire resides in language. For Lacan, language is inherently metaphorical, meaning there is always a gap between what is wished for and what is received. The gap itself is desire and the symbol most central to this desire is the phallus, hence phallogentrism. The phallus does not mean a physical penis, but that the penis comes to represent what is desirable².

*The masculine serves “from the beginning” as the model for what is described and prescribed of the girl’s desire... what Freud says... holds only good if the girl can have none but masculine desires.*³

Irigaray and Cixous recognise that women cannot exist in Lacan’s economy of language because female desire can only ever be expressed through phallogentric symbols and signifiers. Whilst I do not wish to imply that both women think the same way about sexual difference, it is significant that both writers deconstruct patriarchal constructs of subjectivity by opening up spaces to express their desires as women, to speak as embodied women. Through the practices

of *écriture féminine* [“women’s writing] and *parler-femme* [“woman speak”], Irigaray and Cixous attempt to formulate other economies of language that can express the desire and pleasure of the Other, specifically emphasising the multiplicity of sexualities and bodies.

*You can’t talk about ‘a’ female sexuality...*⁴

To speak in singularities is to reflect the oneness of phallogentric language; there is no singular Other, there are many others with many desires and pleasures. Cixous believes that one way for these other(ed) desires to be expressed is through the practice of *écriture féminine*, which she embodies most notably in her essay ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ (1976). The text itself is a work of poetry, weaving together personal sentiments and emotions with feminist philosophy. Cixous states ‘woman must write herself: must write about women and bring women into writing’⁵ emphasising the power of women’s laughter as a way to subvert patriarchal representations of the feminine and to manifest means of expressing women’s desires. *Écriture féminine* is a practice of writing that is ‘grounded in female pleasure’, practiced as a way to subvert the phallogentric language of sameness⁶.

Like Cixous, Irigaray’s feminist philosophy ‘encourages the cultivation of a poetic language’⁷ that enables women to speak as an embodied, desiring subject. Her practice of *parler-femme*, although sharing similarities with *écriture féminine*, is presented explicitly as having multiple meanings including ‘speaking the feminine, speaking of and to

women, speaking as woman-subject, and action or speech by or on behalf of women'⁸. *Parler-femme* is a language –

*an experimental process*⁹

– arising from and speaking of the subject's desire, 'a desire in which language remains in touch, also to and with the body.'¹⁰ By remaining in and of the body, of bodies that have been rendered silent and invisible by phallogentric language, it exposes that which has remained hidden in the logic of the Same. *Parler-femme* is practiced by way of infiltrating patriarchal discourse in order to reveal its hypocrisies and prejudices. Here I want to stress that, although I use the term *parler-femme*, I believe that these different language economies can be created by anyone who is made other by phallogentrism and not just women or people who identify as female. It is a speaking *as other* in order to create other economies of meaning that are grounded in desire.

Irigaray acknowledges that women are reduced to using the phallogentric economy of language because it is the only language currently recognised as existing, but she posits that there are ways for women to create fissures within that economy so as to create a subject position for themselves, so as to speak *as women*. One way Irigaray says to do this is through the use of mimesis. In her seminal book *This Sex Which Is Not One* Irigaray identifies two types of mimesis: the first is 'mimesis as production' and the second, the type that has been favoured throughout the history of

western philosophy, 'is the mimesis that would already be caught up in a process of imitation, specularisation, adequation, and reproduction.'¹¹ She emphasises that the first type of mimesis, what Hilary Robinson calls 'productive mimesis'¹², enables the possibilities for *parler-femme* because it does not simply imitate, and thus reproduce, phallogentric language. Instead, productive mimesis can create an excess to what it is mimicking by building new layers of meaning onto the original. The trope of productive mimesis can be practiced by women 'to try to recover the place of her subordination by discourse, without allowing herself to be reduced to it.'¹³ For Irigaray, mimesis is a 'logic of *disruptive excess*' whereby women enact 'a mimesis of the *representation of 'femininity'* in order to undo it'¹⁴.

*I must insist that women's capacity for resisting the patriarchal order stems not from an ability to take up a masculine subject position, but from reaffirming their subject position in language.*¹⁵

Irigaray's essay 'When Our Lips Speak Together' is a personal favourite of mine. In this text Irigaray imagines the lips as being a model for a different kind of discourse, one that emphasises the sense of touch over sight. Irigaray created an ethics of "between two" where sexual difference is always becoming in an ethical relation to the Other. The lips constitute the body 'as threshold', being neither inside nor outside, and instead emphasise difference, association, and contiguity¹⁶. According to Danielle Poe, the lips provide a

way of discussing ethics ‘as relational instead of hierarchical’ because they are ‘both touched and touching’.¹⁷ There is no dominant subject or passive object in the economy of the lips, but rather an affectionate exchange based on the infinite gestures of touch between them. It is significant to note that Margaret Whitford, in her reading of this essay, stresses that there are ‘at least two’ lips making them ‘strangers to dichotomy’, as a way to disengage from the binary thinking of phallogocentric logic.¹⁸ The at least two lips signify a kind of openness that enables ‘an expansion of movement that is unlimited’.¹⁹

*And there is born of this movement a self-perpetuating and self-developing formation of desire, an imaginary of the sexuate body whose form never detached itself from the matter which generates it.*²⁰

Whitford also states that, in the ‘at least two’ lips that are perpetually moving and developing, ‘the process of becoming form – and circle- is not only never complete or completable; it takes place... thanks to this non-completion...’²¹. The lips, forever touched and touching, are not progressing to a final evolved state; they are continually becoming in an alliance with themselves across lateral exchanges of desire and expression. Although Irigaray has criticised Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of becoming, specifically becoming-woman, I want to suggest that the analogy of the ‘at least two’ lips, as metonymic for ‘not-one’ lips, is a mode of becoming through an emphasis on multiplicity and fluidity.

*Becoming and multiplicity are the same thing.*²²

In their discussions on becoming, Deleuze and Guattari stress that ‘the self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities’, it is not a process of evolution or produced by filiation but rather it is a verb, and to become is to be ‘transformed by contagion’.²³ It is important to note that they specifically state that becoming does not involve imitating that which you desire to become.

*We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or you are. What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes.*²⁴

However, I would like to propose that their thoughts on imitation relate to the second type of mimesis discussed earlier in this essay, a process caught in reproduction and adequation, and that productive mimesis, which creates an excess, is a type of becoming that occurs through transformation. Irigaray claims that ‘the realm of music’²⁵ is one that can enable possibilities for productive mimesis and *parler-femme*, and I would also like to propose that other economies of language, grounded in desire, could be produced through vocal performances, particularly singing.

*I am spacious, singing flesh, on which is grafted no one knows which I, more or less human, but alive because of transformation.*²⁶





Over the past ten months or so I have become increasingly attached to the figure of the Siren from Homer's *Odyssey*. In this epic tale of the lone hero, Odysseus, King of Ithaca, is returning home after the fall of Troy in the Trojan War. It takes him ten years to reach Ithaca because, along his journey, he encounters many monstrous beasts that delay his travels. One group of beasts are the Sirens who dwell on the edges of a rocky island in the Mediterranean Sea, luring passing ships to the cliffs with their enchanting voices. The appearance of the Siren has varied throughout history; she has been presented as a woman-bird, a woman-fish, or sometimes both, as well as a serpent or a fairy²⁷.

*The Siren therefore epitomises hybridity... The only constancy is a human-like voice.*²⁸

Their voice is impossible to resist and, when lured into their watery depths, the captured would face a slow and painful death on the rocks, their bones left strewn across the island. However, in the *Odyssey*, a powerful witch Circe warns Odysseus about the dangerous Siren Song, advising him to strap himself to the mast of his ship and block the ears of his men with wax so only he can hear their singing and thus have a stronger chance of survival. Odysseus follows Circe's orders and does indeed survive his encounter with the Sirens, leaving them disempowered and disarmed, their song no longer holding the same potency as it did before.

There have been many interpretations and re-readings

of the Siren episode from the *Odyssey*, two of which are those by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, and Franz Kafka. I do not wish to dwell too long on these versions of the story but do want to make the point that these accounts do little to provide the Sirens with a means of self-expression; the Sirens are continuously spoken for or about, and are in the stories to serve as a negative, monstrous feminine opposite of Odysseus, the brave, masculine hero. Horkheimer with Adorno, in their book *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, use the story to present Odysseus as a figure of capitalism, who prevents his men from aesthetic pleasure so he alone can experience the Siren Song. Whilst an interesting point, I agree with Michael Bull that 'they gloss over the specific auditory nature of the experience' and instead the Sirens become mere props in the narrative.²⁹

Kafka, whilst paying far more attention to the Sirens in his essay *The Silence of the Sirens*, Renata Salecl astutely explains how his re-reading 'can easily be understood as a myth that endeavours to restore men to their dominant position.'³⁰ In Kafka's version of the encounter, the Sirens don't actually sing. Odysseus sees their 'throats rising and falling, their breasts lifting, their eyes filled with tears, their lips half-parted'³¹ but believes that, in all his arrogance, only he cannot hear them. He thinks he has 'mastered their voice', making 'his gaze so alluring in its self-confidence' that the Sirens can't help but fall in love with him.³²

A man does not perish when encountering a seductive, monstrous female if he reverses the situation

*and incites the female to fall in love with him. If some stories say that the Sirens committed suicide when they failed to enchant Odysseus, Kafka offers an even more devastating account of the Sirens' power: it was because they fell in love with Odysseus that they were unable to even sing.*³³

It was Cixous in 'The Laugh of the Medusa' who said that the Sirens were men, reflecting a long and tiresome history of male writers speaking for women, usurping the power of the other by casting it as monstrous, abject, and silent. Just like the women spoken about by Plato, Alberti, Kant, Burke, Nietzsche, Hegel, Balthasar and so on and so on, the Sirens have been co-opted into narratives to serve only masculine desires. I want to try and reclaim the Siren, as Haraway reclaimed the Cyborg, and present her as what Braidotti calls a 'conceptual persona', not a metaphor but a 'materially embodied stage of metamorphosis' that is relational, interactive and invested in the desire for change.³⁴ In the latter part of this essay, I want to discuss the possibilities of a becoming Siren through the act of vocal performance, in the vein of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of becoming as multiplicity and alliance between heterogenous terms and the Siren as a hybrid and liminal figure.

Firstly, I want to state the provocation that becoming Siren is inherently cyborgian in relation to Donna Haraway's figuration of the feminist Cyborg in her seminal work, 'A Cyborg Manifesto' published in 1985. Haraway wrote the manifesto in an effort to formulate the concept of a feminist

Cyborg in the midst of the Regan era in America and the decline of leftist, socialist politics. Her figuration of the Cyborg blasphemes against its origins in militaristic technology; the cybernetic organism has its origins back in 1960 when N.A.S.A. engineers Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline coined the term to denote a human/machine hybrid.³⁵ It was a construction used commonly for militaristic and capitalist purposes but, in her manifesto, Haraway reappropriates the figure of the militaristic Cyborg and rewires it into something feminist and radical.

Haraway recognised the existing cultural capital of the Cyborg but emphasised that these origins are inessential; as a form of productive mimesis, the iconography of the Cyborg can be transformed through the tactic of appropriation as an intervention against its past. The Cyborg becomes not a construct of totalitarianism but a figure of multiplicity and difference; it is, as Haraway says, an 'on-the-ground working project' that is lived out through the agency of its embodied subjects. The Cyborg is 'identity-in-motion', an ontology that has the potential of constantly becoming other; it becomes a political practice, a nomadic body weaving together different lived experiences.³⁶ Instead of thinking about the Cyborg too literally, it is more productive to think of the Cyborg as a 'performative image', an inhabitable persona that one can embody through a becoming Cyborg. Becoming Siren and becoming Cyborg can share an alliance with one another as creating subjectivities of undisclosed identities as well as liminal spaces³⁷.



Deleuze's hybrid nomadic selves; the multiple feminist-operated becoming-woman of women; Irigaray's woman as not-one; Haraway's cyborgs, not unlike Cixous's new Medusa, are often rendered in the old-fashioned social imaginary as monstrous, hybrid, scary deviants. What if what was at fault here, however, were the very social imaginary that can only register changes of this magnitude on the panic-stricken moralistic register of deviancy? What if these unprogrammed-for others were forms of subjectivity that have simply shrugged off the shadow of binary logic and negativity and have moved on?³⁸

The Siren, like the Cyborg, has moved on, or at least it has the desire to. Sirens are tired of their imposed silence and angry at their forced repression; it is time for them to speak of their own thoughts and wishes and for us to truly hear the meanings of their song. Music and vocal performance enables a cultivation of a language that is more poetic and expressive than speech, whereby the sound of song can connect people to one another by enabling a type of becoming through 'breathing, silence, touching and expressivity.'³⁹ The liminality of Irigaray's 'at least two' lips is identifiable in the Cyborg with its various crossings between different machines and organisms; the boundaries between "self" and "other" are transgressed through their constant encounters and I propose that these cyborgian lips can be embodied through the act of vocal performance and a becoming Siren⁴⁰.

Esther Zaplana Rodriguez, in her analysis of Irigaray's work, explains that, for her, 'music is a source of energy and inspiration that enables a becoming' because music begins and then returns to the embodied subject that produces it.⁴¹ Singing is about and of the body, emanating from deep below the surface and projected outwards through multiplicities of time and space; this voice can 'underpin and elaborate' particular politics through lyrics, and yet can also 'extend those meanings well beyond the singularly verbal.'⁴²

Vocal performances, by which I am specifically referring to singing, can be acts of 'subjective displacement' and 'personal decentering' in both the singer and the listener.⁴³ The Sirens and their enchanting song remind us of the pleasures of music, and of the potential for surrender and engulfment in sonic experiences.⁴⁴ A becoming Siren would thus entail an ethical relation between the singer and the listener, a collective becoming Siren. Odysseus, as listener, is becoming Siren just as much as, if not more so, than the Sirens themselves. The memories the Sirens wish to bestow him with, and the overwhelming fascination he has for their song, are part of the transformative nature of becoming Siren. Bodies start to disintegrate and fuse together and subjects almost become annihilated as they experience the intense desire for the voice as object, an object that is neither yours nor mine but a collective sonic entity.

It is important not to prize the live performance over the recorded. A recorded song may exist on a different register to a live performance but it is important not to position them hierarchically, but rather in a lateral relationship

with one another, like with Irigaray's lips. Although Peggy Phelan makes a valid argument that live performance without the copy ensures that it remains 'exempt from control... by the economy, including the law', I do not agree with her claim that 'disappearance' is the most crucial characteristic of performance.⁴⁵ I see this view as one that upholds the privileging of the original, whereby the copy is inherently cast as less authentic and thus less meaningful. Although Phelan is quite right to express fears about the co-opting of radical performance by capitalism in order to either repress it or control it, the avoidance of such power structures through disappearance is just not enough. Not only would it be practically impossible today with the proliferation of recording technology, from mobile phones to CCTV cameras, but also disappearing is something inflicted upon the other by phallogentrism to begin with. As Irigaray and Cixous have illustrated, there is a need for other economies of language because difference is repressed and made invisible within a phallogentric ideology. This is why the tactic of productive mimesis is vital in creating new openings for expression; it is impossible to get away from recording technology and recorded material, therefore one way to subvert patriarchal power structures is to appropriate the material and create something *in excess* of the original.

Furthermore, these days it is far more common for a listener to experience a recording of a vocal performance rather than experiencing it live. Music is becoming increasingly portable through the advancement of technology and recordings are more easily accessible, especially for those

who can't go to live performances for reasons such as medical or economic etc.

The recording has become the standard mode of listening, as well as of musical or vocal performance display; although the body source of the voice is not there to be seen, the recording continues to open the possibilities for the listeners' identification with the music and their imagination of the singing body.⁴⁶

I agree with this interjection from Zaplana Rodriguez, but want to also say that it is increasingly common now for pre-recorded music to be used within live performance. It isn't just the case of a physical body singing live or a virtual recording of the music disembodied from its source, there can often be the presence of a live performing body using pre-recorded material. In David Lynch's film *Mulholland Drive* (2001), a film set in Los Angeles about a young actress named Betty (Naomi Watts) trying to help a woman, supposedly named Rita (Laura Harring), left with amnesia after a horrific car crash, there is a scene set in a club where the two women watch a performance by La Llorona ("weeping woman"). La Llorona is well known in hispanoamerican folklore as being the ghost of a woman who drowned her children, and then herself, in a river. She is then banished from heaven until she finds them and is forced to wander earth for eternity, trying to find her children in vain as she constantly weeps and cries out for them. In *Mulholland Drive*, La Llorona, who is played by Latin American singer



Rebecca del Rio, enters the stage and begins to sing a Spanish version of Roy Orbison's song 'Crying'. The song tells a story of heartbreak, and is so touching that Betty and Rita, their eyes transfixed on the performer, both begin to cry.

An empathetic circuit forms between performer and audience, creating a force that interrupts the narrative of the film.⁴⁷

The sadness and longing that La Llorona conveys through her performance, whether for her children or an ex-lover or neither, move members of the audience to tears. It is also not clear if her emotions are real or acted, but it does not stifle the affectivity of her performance. What happens next in the scene then creates an entirely different set of meanings to the performance. La Llorona collapses on the floor but her voice keeps singing. It becomes evident that she had been lip-syncing rather than singing live, which is emphasised by the fact she faints before the song has ended. When the camera then cuts back to Betty and Rita, it almost seems like their melancholy has intensified by this turn of events; they are not angered by the fact that La Llorona was mimicking the words and gestures of the song, but perhaps even more devastated that the weight of her desire has caused her to collapse.

The emotion expressed causes La Llorona to pass out on the stage, her expression much too big to fit the contours of her individual human body.⁴⁸

Elena del Rio's commentary on this scene is very poignant, and she describes how this performance demonstrates 'that the displacement of desire through virtual bodies or objects is no less a reality than the actual physical presence of those bodies or objects.' The song's origin is superfluous to the affectivity of the moment. The emotion that passes from Roy Orbison's original song, to Rebecca del Rio's recording, through to del Rio as La Llorona miming the song and then outwards to Betty and Rita in the audience, and again outwards to us watching the film, becomes like a chain that has no clear origin.⁴⁹ These virtual bodies, as they are becoming Siren with their 'at least two' lips, are being touched and are touching simultaneously so that self and other is no longer distinguishable.

Rather than one subject owning the affect, it dwells in and passes through the multiplicity of bodies.⁵⁰

In Kafka's re-reading of Odysseus' encounter with the Sirens, it describes how Odysseus sees their 'throats rising and falling, their breasts lifting, their eyes filled with tears, their lips half-parted'⁵¹ even though they are, in fact, silent. Linda Phyllis Austern states that Kafka's story 'relies on the mime of emotive musical performance' to create the illusion of authenticity and, by taking Austern's interpretation further, I now believe that the Sirens pretend to sing, not because they have fallen in love with Odysseus, but because they are mocking him. Like the laughter of Cixous's Medusa, the monstrous, cyborgian bodies of the Sirens laugh in the

face of the patriarchy, acting out their vocal performance with their ‘at least two’ lips as a way to affirm their agency as speaking and desiring subjects. The fact that Odysseus believed they were singing illustrates how the boundaries between what is genuine or what is mimed, as well as what is live and what is recorded, may not be discernable.

The co-presence of the binary oppositions puts our notions of the real into a potential crisis, where such an embrace of fragmentation may open up the potential for what Carolyn Burke calls a ‘plural’ language style, one which reshapes syntax in order to open up a different economy of language, a *parler-femme*⁵². Like with the ontology of Haraway’s Cyborg, the use of appropriation, both physical and virtual, within the scene at Club Silencio means that the song unfolds as a self-perpetuating and self-sufficient catalyst for expression. This circulation of emotion through virtual bodies relates to what Steve Wurtzler calls ‘the fragmented, decentred subject’ resulting from an apparent collapse of distinctions between what is live and what is recorded, and what is original and what is a copy⁵³. This scene uses mimesis as production in order for La Llorona, the monstrous, murdering, singing Siren, to speak for herself and to speak *as* woman, reappropriating a song originally written by a man to give it new life and meaning to express her own desires.

To conclude, I would first like to say that I hope this essay is treated more as an experiment and a provocation than an exhaustive account of what becoming Siren may entail. Like with the Cyborg, a becoming Siren is a working project that explores what it may mean to embody and

to empathise with other(ed) desires and emotions, specifically through vocal performance. The voice of the Siren is what has remained a constant in their story throughout history, but their singing is too often co-opted by male writers who use them as props in a narrative of male self-preservation. By finally learning to listen to the Siren and by creating a language for her to speak, a *parler-femme*, she will no longer be cast out as a monstrous, abject figure whose desire can only be measured by her (positive) male counterpart.

In this essay I have explored how a becoming Siren may occur within performances that present an intersection between liveness and recorded material as a way to subvert the authenticity of the original (as an economy of Oneness) and to express new registers of meaning through multiplicity. Whilst I acknowledge Phelan’s criticism that copies of performances can be usurped by capitalism and by the law, with issues of copyright for example, the impossibility of avoiding recording technology as well as the fact that disappearance is a weapon of phallogentrism means that we must find other ways to create visibility for the other that don’t fall back into economies of the Same.

La Llorona’s performance in Lynch’s film is an example of the intersections between original and copy, live and recording, self and other that are part of a becoming Siren. The fact she was lip-syncing doesn’t demean the emotional affectivity of the performance; virtual and physical bodies borrow and lend the emotions and expressions conveyed in the performance, along a series of vectors that can no longer lead back to a distinct origin. The power of the recording lies

in its ability to be appropriated at will, a catalyst for productive mimesis that can bring new nourishment and meaning to what came before. A becoming Siren is one way of embodying this type of performance, where the use of productive mimesis can create openings in phallogocentric logic to enable the expression of a multiplicity of desires and emotions. As Irigaray proclaims, 'let's reappropriate our mouths and try to speak... let's not be ravished by their language again', and I add to this and say let's finally listen to the Sirens and feel their lips touch us in prosthetic gestures, let's sing with them and embody their song as a way to express our own desires. I'd rather be a Siren than a goddess.

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